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The Evaluation of Welfare State Performance: 
Modelling a Counterfactual World 
Jens Ennen ∗ 
Abstract: »Was wäre gewesen, wenn...? Evaluation sozialstaatlicher Maß-
nahmen mithilfe kontrafaktischer Modelle«. The evaluation of welfare state 
performance is an important issue in times of tight government budgets, high 
unemployment and growing inequality. Policymakers and taxpayers want to 
know if a specific programme has led to the intended effect, and with no ex-
cessive waste of resources. For such evaluations to be thorough and robust, ap-
propriate methods and the right counterfactuals are important. It is difficult to 
say what would have happened if a certain policy had not been implemented or 
implemented differently. This holds even more for the impact on a single indi-
vidual than for aggregate results. This article will highlight some examples and 
possibilities of how to deal with counterfactual questions in the context of the 
Hartz reforms, probably the most far-reaching welfare state and labour market 
changes in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. Furthermore this 
reform was the first big attempt of systematic welfare state evaluation in Ger-
many. 
Keywords: Welfare state, evaluation, counterfactuals, Hartz. 
Introduction 
Governments of industrialised countries are providing welfare schemes for 
citizens in need. Of course the specific organisation, financing and generosity 
of such mechanisms differ between economies, but the common motivation is 
that all people are subject to risks like illness, old-age and unemployment. The 
extent of exposure varies with age, gender, class and personal characteristics, 
but by pooling individual risk over large parts of society, compensation 
schemes reduce individual exposure in terms of the maximum potential finan-
cial loss. 
As a consequence of the substantial spending on welfare systems, taxpayers 
want to know if the money has indeed a positive impact on the targeted popula-
tion. Furthermore, the question arises if the same or even better results could 
have been achieved with fewer resources. Imposing a tax on the public or in-
troducing compulsory contributions in order to use them for the welfare system 
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means that spending – on the personal level as well as by the state – is not 
available for alternative uses any more.  
Finding out if spending has indeed reached the target without too substantial 
adverse effects elsewhere requires asking the question what the outcome would 
have been in the absence of the welfare programme or under an alternative 
scheme. This is in fact a counterfactual question because we cannot precisely 
know what would have happened if at a certain point in time we had not de-
cided to set up the scheme. Time goes on and we cannot rewind the passage of 
time like a video tape. 
Answering counterfactual questions is not easy and economists have to 
come up with methods to estimate the outcomes of paths that were not taken in 
reality. Such estimations are often not very accurate, but due to the importance 
of such questions, it may be better to have crude estimates than none. 
In which situations do economists ask counterfactual questions about wel-
fare state performance and which methods do they use in order to answer 
them? 
This article will illustrate the importance of counterfactual questions by tak-
ing the comprehensive labour market reforms in Germany as an example. 
These so-called Hartz reforms are interesting units of observation because on 
the one hand they can be considered as the most far reaching reforms of the 
German labour market and welfare state in the history of the Federal Republic. 
On the other they were the first big attempt to professionally evaluate the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of the German welfare system (Jacobi and Kluve 2006). 
First of all the context and the details of the reform will be described. Then an 
overview over the different ways of counterfactual estimation will be provided 
before evaluation results will be presented. 
The Hartz Reforms: Context 
The main idea behind the comprehensive labour market and welfare reforms, 
which are usually called Hartz reforms, had the general purpose to reduce the 
extent of unemployment in Germany by improving the matching of jobseekers 
with vacancies, by putting all able-bodied welfare recipients into one category 
and by reducing the generosity and duration of maximum unemployment insur-
ance benefits. Specifically pressure was increased on jobseekers to take up 
vacant positions (ibid). 
A commission named “Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt” [mod-
ern labour market services] was established by the federal government and 
chaired by Peter Hartz, board member and HR director of Volkswagen (which 
explains the unofficial name Hartz reforms).  
Prior to the reform there had been concerns about the big amount and persis-
tence of unemployment in Germany. Since the beginning of the 1970s the 
Federal Republic has suffered from an increase in the number of people out of 
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job. Of course there were recurring economic upturns with resulting falls in 
unemployment, but the general development of joblessness was step-shaped. 
After strong business cycles unemployment did not fall to the level that pre-
vailed during the prior boom. This does not only hold for Germany but also for 
other (continental) European economies. According to economic theory the 
resulting structural unemployment can be explained by the existence of institu-
tions that prevent market forces from reducing real wages to a level that would 
dampen the extent of unemployment. The purpose of this paper is not to pre-
sent theories that explain unemployment and its sources, but the gradual in-
crease in natural unemployment should be kept in mind when discussing the 
motivation for introducing the reforms. The increase in joblessness since the 
1970s is not particular to the Federal Republic. What is indeed special about 
the German economy is the reunification with the former socialist East. The 
GDR’s economy turned out to be less efficient than expected by experts, with 
factory closures and resulting mass layoffs that contributed to the breakdown of 
the old industrial centres of the East. The other former planned economies did 
not have the possibility to get support from a relatively rich West, but for Ger-
many a quick approximation of living standards in the East to the level of the 
West was considered to be necessary for political and ethical reasons (ibid.). 
Therefore the relatively well-developed West-German welfare state was – with 
some special rules – imposed on the East. Avoiding too dramatic differences in 
material well-being between both parts was certainly a good intention, but 
turned out to be difficult and expensive for the reunified economy. Many re-
searchers like Hagen and Steiner (2000) or Caliendo and Steiner (2005) have 
investigated the development of spending on active employment policy over 
time. The motivation for such policies is the belief that measures like spending 
on education for disadvantaged people or public job creation schemes fight the 
underlying causes of unemployment. Policymakers decided to introduce such 
policies especially in the East where the share of active policies amounted to 
30.9 per cent of total spending on labour market policy, in contrast to only 23.9 
per cent in the West (Caliendo and Schneider 2005). In 1991 more than 3 out of 
ten members of the East German labour force participated in active measures 
like training and public job creation (Wunsch 2005). In addition to this quanti-
tative importance of active measures in terms of participants, these pro-
grammes lasted relatively long. On the other hand the welfare state created a 
situation in which unemployed individuals had no strong incentives to take up 
jobs, provided that they existed in some areas of the country. Engels (2001) 
came to the conclusion that in the year 1990 the average family income of a 4-
person-household with three children was only 15.3 (11.5) per cent lower in the 
West (East) than of a similar household with a single earner who had an un-
skilled job.  
The West-German economy would probably also have needed reforms in 
the absence of reunification, but this article will not deal with this counterfac-
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tual question. Nevertheless it is safe to say that the German reunification has, in 
spite of its multiple benefits, intensified the pressures on the welfare state. 
An important factor for the growing willingness to reform the labour market 
was a scandal within the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (BA) [the federal labour 
office], whose civil servants had published falsified figures in order to provide 
an overoptimistic picture about the success in placing unemployed people with 
vacancies. This incident and the media coverage of the scandal then incited the 
federal government under Gerhard Schröder to accelerate efforts that lead to a 
reform of the BA and its policy. The proposals of the Hartz commission were 
then implemented by the red-green coalition. Here, I will only highlight the 
most important components of the reforms. 
Hartz Reforms: The Changes 
The multitude of changes introduced between 2003 and 2005 can be put into 
three categories, as described by Jacobi and Kluve (2006). 
The first pillar of reforms had the purpose to improve the services provided 
by the government authorities. Given the BA’s extremely poor placement re-
sults, one component of the reform was to change the organisational structure 
of the public employment services. A stronger customer-orientation with fixed 
personal caseworkers and a monitoring of the BA’s placement results services 
was the idea behind the change. In spite of the stricter evaluation of their work, 
the employment services obtained a greater discretion in deciding how to put 
their objectives into reality. In order to underline the stronger service orienta-
tion the BA was rebranded Bundesagentur für Arbeit [Federal labour agency], 
which makes it sound more modern and not so much like an office run by civil 
servants. Furthermore, the government decided to introduce a wider range of 
market mechanisms into the placement and training activities. After six weeks 
of unsuccessful placement jobseekers can ask for vouchers that make them 
eligible for support by private firms that are compensated if they succeed in 
finding an appropriate position. Private firms can also apply for offering train-
ing to unemployed persons. In order to make sure that an unemployed individ-
ual gets the support that corresponds to his or her needs, caseworkers put job-
seekers into several categories corresponding to the likelihood of being placed 
quickly. This stronger targeting is meant to avoid situations in which people 
who are likely to find jobs within a short time horizon anyway fill training 
places that should rather be occupied by jobseekers who really need them. 
The final step under the first pillar, as categorized by Jacobi and Kluve 
(2006), was the requirement that professional evaluators monitor the effective-
ness of the reforms. This means that about 20 research institutes with about 100 
experts closely follow the reforms. We will come to the theoretical foundations 
for the evaluation of the reforms later. 
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The second pillar of the reforms may be considered as the central compo-
nent of the whole project. The notion that summarises the idea behind it is 
“fördern und fordern”, which means that jobseekers receive support, but con-
versely the BA requires them to actively participate in the assistance process. 
This activation of jobseekers means that the whole benefit system changes in 
order to put jobseekers under more pressure. Before the reforms, jobseekers 
who had had a regular job were entitled to receive Arbeitslosengeld [unem-
ployment benefit], which is part of the social insurance system and earnings-
related, for an initial time period, and then they were still eligible for Arbeits-
losenhilfe [unemployment aid], a tax-financed benefit. This second scheme was 
less generous than the first one, but still related to prior earnings. Jobseekers 
obtained entitlement to unemployment aid for time periods of one year, but it 
was usually extended without a maximum spell. The Hartz reforms abolished 
the unemployment aid scheme, which means that unemployed persons are only 
eligible for Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG II) [unemployment benefit II] after the 
expiration of Arbeitslosengeld I (ALG I) [unemployment benefit I]. ALG II is 
means-tested and is reduced to the level of social assistance. All able-bodied 
individuals are merged into one category and obtain a tax-financed benefit that 
is unrelated to prior earnings. Those people who had regular jobs subject to 
social insurance contribution first obtain ALG I whereas jobseekers without 
social insurance contribution directly move into ALG II. If the authorities have 
the impression that the recipient does not actively contribute to efforts to make 
future employment more probable (e.g. writing applications, participating in 
training or workfare), the BA is allowed to reduce benefit payments. This 
stronger pressure on the unemployed had the purpose to increase labour supply, 
accelerate the filling of vacancies and to reduce the abuse of the welfare system 
by individuals who are able but unwilling to make a living by working. On the 
other hand a side-effect of the reforms is the growing fear to fall through the 
welfare net, even for the middle classes who were – before Hartz – less prone 
to concerns about their financial well-being in the future. This issue is impor-
tant to take into account when talking about German society due to its stronger 
emphasis on security than Anglo-Saxon cultures where risk aversion seems to 
be less pronounced. In spite of its broad coverage in the media this question is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
Other measures under the second pillar are the extended possibility for job-
seekers to obtain start-up subsidies on the basis of a business plan approved by 
the BA, which then leads to the creation of an Ich-AG [Me, Inc.], or an exten-
sion of wage subsidies to employers under the condition they employ workers 
who are considered as hard to place on the regular labour market, like older 
people. In order to increase incentives to take up jobs for earners with only low 
incomes, the government decided to introduce so-called Midijobs. This means 
that people who earn between 400 and 800 Euros per month receive social 
security subsidies in such a form that the amount of the support decreases with 
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increases in earnings. Once an employee reaches the threshold of 800 Euros the 
subsidy is phased out (Jacobi and Kluve 2006). 
The third pillar of changes constitutes comprehensive labour market deregu-
lation. This refers to the rules related to temporary work, fixed-term contracts, 
and wage setting. It is safe to say that the changes related to this category are 
the least pronounced in the context of the Hartz reforms. Wage setting has 
remained relatively centralised in the Federal Republic and regulation of tem-
porary work had already gradually become less intense in the years before 
Hartz. In the domain of dismissal law not so much has changed. After the re-
form also people who are older than 52 but younger than 58 years have the 
possibility to get their fixed contracts renewed repeatedly, whereas this was 
only possible for employees older than 58 years before. Furthermore exemp-
tions from dismissal law only applied to companies with less than ten employ-
ees before in contrast to only five after the big changes (ibid.). 
Counterfactual Questions in Economics 
Counterfactual questions about the economy not only occupy economists but 
can also be heard from laymen in everyday life. The current financial crisis 
with the resulting abundance of press articles, TV programmes and discussions 
among the general public about the ‘right’ economic policy clearly illustrates 
the importance of counterfactual thinking. We can often hear questions like the 
following: What would have happened if there had been stricter regulation of 
financial products? Could the crisis have been avoided if rating agencies had 
more sophisticated methods for evaluating companies’ financial performance? 
Would it have been possible to avoid the spread of the crisis if the US govern-
ment had not decided to let a big financial-services firm go bankrupt? 
In spite of the importance and topical interest in such questions related to the 
world of finance, the purpose of this article is to look more closely at the wel-
fare state and its performance. Although in the last months, welfare state dis-
cussions did not receive as much public attention as the financial crisis, the 
topic is still relevant to researchers as well as the general public. Given the 
worries about unemployment, low real wages and the ageing of many Western 
economies, the right remedies against these phenomena are searched and 
widely debated. Taking into account the large amount of resources spent on the 
alleviation of risks like unemployment, illness and old-age, we first want to 
know if a specific programme has in fact been effective. Has it led to the in-
tended effect? If a welfare programmed aimed at reducing child poverty by 
introducing in-kind benefits, like the provision of free school lunches has con-
tributed to a lower overall percentage of poor children and a lower depth of 
poverty, then we may be safe to reject the hypothesis that this policy was not 
effective. 
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Nevertheless, effectiveness is not a sufficient condition for success. In a 
second step we want to investigate if the programme under scrutiny has been 
efficient. In order to answer this question the evaluator tries to find out if the 
benefit that is attributed to the programme is big enough in relation to the costs 
involved. Even if we are sure that the scheme has contributed to a reduction in 
child poverty, it may be the case that the financial outlays, i.e. government 
spending, have been very substantial, but the reduction in poverty only moder-
ate. It could be the case that the same expenditure elsewhere would have had a 
more beneficial impact. 
Cowan and Foray (2002) emphasise the importance of counterfactual eco-
nomic history for the analysis of the evolution of economic phenomena. They 
claim that a large number of economists still regard explicit counterfactual 
reasoning with suspicion although nowadays there is an increasing amount of 
economic models which are based on multiple equilibria. Conventional models 
that had unique outcomes were more straightforward to anlayse concerning 
their predicted outcomes, whereas in situations with a large amount of possible 
equilibria questions about the ‘best’ outcome become more important. If only 
one equilibrium is considered the researchers slightly change some exogenous 
parameters and try to see which of the outcomes is the most preferred one. In a 
situation with more equilibria this is more difficult because not only small 
parameter changes have to be taken into account, but also decisions taken much 
earlier, which have led on a unique path to a certain equilibrium. In other 
words, the researcher has to consider questions of path-dependency. This 
means that the economist searches for points in the past when decision were 
taken which ex-post have led to a course of events that make a convergence to 
different outcome at later stages highly unlikely. Would it be more efficient if 
an alternative to the now common QWERTY-keyboard on typewriters had 
become the standard? Would this allow faster typing? (David 1985) This is in 
accordance with what Elster (1978) calls a branching view of history. Each 
point in history where a certain decision is taken is the beginning of a new 
branch, which in turn will split up into several boughs when new decisions are 
taken. This tree paradigm is in contrast to an alternative, less historical ap-
proach in which a world is modelled which is almost the same as the actual 
world. Lewis (1973a and 1973b) calls it a possible world that runs parallel to 
the actual world and teaches us something about reality. The crucial step is to 
model a world that is different from the real world (and therefore counterfac-
tual), but “only to minimum extent” (Kluve 2004:93). This then facilitates the 
creation of an evaluation with appropriate counterfactuals.  
Although at first sight it does not seem to be surprising that the performance 
of the welfare state is evaluated, the close collaboration between economists (as 
evaluators) and politicians (as the persons who decide on the introduction and 
specific format of welfare programmes) does not have a long tradition in 
Europe. In the United States such a pooling of efforts between science and 
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administration had already begun earlier. In Europe – not so long ago – large 
amounts of money were spent simply in the hope that the programmes must 
somehow make sense. The reasons why a change in the willingness to monitor 
welfare programmes has occurred are diverse. The steady increase in unem-
ployment in (continental) Europe over time may have contributed to an increas-
ing scepticism towards conventional active labour market policy. It may be the 
case that the situation was considered to be so alarming that scepticism towards 
evaluations was not tenable any more. Secondly high public debt and fiscal 
limits imposed by the European Monetary Union have probably contributed to 
a break-up of opposition to scientific investigations. Thirdly the growing im-
portance may be explained by a wave from the United States with the common 
hand-in-hand evaluations of public policy. A reason may be that American 
politicians and economists have always been more sceptical towards state in-
tervention into the economy and therefore a stronger eagerness to monitor 
welfare policy is the result. In the case of Germany, the so-called Hartz reforms 
were the first big attempt to systematically evaluate the performance of the 
welfare state. The introduction of the Dritte Buch Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB III) 
[Third code of social law] in 1998, which lays the foundations for active meas-
ures on the labour market, demands related policy to be systematically evalu-
ated. Concerning the contents and the orientation of SGB III in comparison to 
its predecessor, the Arbeitsförderungsgesetz (AFG) [labour promotion law], the 
new code has a stronger focus on groups whose labour market status is espe-
cially difficult, like older people, long-term unemployed and lowly qualified 
persons (Fitzenberger and Hujer 2001). The Hartz reforms as the most inten-
sive set of changes were then the first big application of the new monitoring 
requirements. 
Before the introduction of Hartz there were in fact economists who evalu-
ated the performance of elements of the welfare state, but as a consequence of 
the relatively widespread reluctance among policymakers towards such investi-
gation there was not enough data for robust and strictly significant monitoring 
of the German welfare state. These studies hinted at possible problems and 
were able to push researchers’ interests into certain directions, but in spite of 
the big efforts the lack of a crucial amount of reliable statistical material re-
duced the precision and explanatory power of the studies. The relatively recent 
abundance of statistical data has sparked researchers’ interest in the evaluation 
of the German welfare state and has already contributed to a more precise body 
of knowledge. We will come to the results later and first address the difficulties 
of welfare state evaluations and the methods that economists apply in order to 
find answers.  
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Evaluation of Welfare State Performance: 
Difficulties and Solutions 
Fertig and Kluve (2004) set up a framework that lays the theoretical founda-
tions of the Hartz reforms’ evaluation. Their work also elaborates on general 
problems of welfare state analyses, but also takes the particularities of the 
German situation into account. According to both scholars there are two con-
ceptual problems associated with the comprehensive labour market and welfare 
state reforms. The first difficulty is grounded on the fact that changes in the 
administration of unemployment services provided by the BA and specific 
labour market policies occurred simultaneously. If caseworkers have more 
discretion in applying the appropriate policy mix, it is likely to affect the per-
formance of a specific new or modified programme too. Therefore the scholars 
propose to include control variables that take the quality of the BA’s services 
into account. The second difficulty has to do with the problem that some of the 
new measures are open to all members of the labour force equally (e.g the 
possibility to take up a Midi-Job). There is no appropriate counterfactual case 
because there are no people who are unaffected by the reform (ibid.). 
Concerning the steps needed for a careful evaluation of changes like the 
ones caused by Hartz, it is important to analyse a programme’s effectiveness, 
its efficiency and the reasons for these criteria. Effectiveness refers to the ques-
tion whether the scheme under investigation has indeed led to the intended 
target. To give an example: ‘Has the provision of placement vouchers contrib-
uted to a quicker matching of jobseekers with vacancies? How are in contrast 
to this the job finding results of those who did not get such a possibility?’ are 
questions that aim at the effect of a scheme. The methods mentioned in the 
following subchapter take into account the effectiveness of welfare pro-
grammes, mainly on a micro level, which is less complex to evaluate than the 
overall macro effects. The efficiency of a programme under scrutiny addresses 
the question if the benefits (e.g. the placement success due to the voucher) are 
bigger than the costs involved. Most taxpayers would be reluctant to a scheme 
that requires substantial monetary outlays, but only yields minor benefits. Find-
ing out the costs involved is a tricky endeavour, because there are not only 
direct costs involved, but also indirect pecuniary effects that researchers should 
– ideally – incorporate into their analyses (ibid.). Opportunity costs are an 
important keyword in this context. Money we spend on a welfare measure 
cannot be used for alternative uses any more. Even if a specific programme 
turns out to be cost efficient at first sight (direct benefit > direct costs) the 
money could have created an even more positive impact elsewhere in the econ-
omy (e.g. the stimulus caused by a tax cut). We will come back to such indirect 
effects when talking about macroeconomic analyses later in the following 
subchapter. 
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For Fertig and Kluve (2004) a third step in the evaluation of the Hartz re-
forms involves an investigation of the implementation and the process. The 
purpose of this task is to find the causes of the effectiveness and efficiency (or 
the lack of these first two criteria of success). This final step is less technical, 
relies mainly on qualitative data and considers the context of the reform. It may 
be the case that researchers survey BA staff or jobseekers in order to get an 
idea about the precise implementation of the policy (ibid.). 
Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Analyses 
A precise presentation of the methodologies that labour economists apply in 
their analysis of questions related to work and welfare would be too technical 
and beyond the scope of this article. Alternatively some of the methods used by 
professional evaluators will briefly be described in order to provide a general 
understanding about the logic behind such mechanisms. I will deal with eco-
nomic experiments, matching and difference-in-differences estimations, meth-
ods which are according to Fertig and Kluve (2004) the most prominent ones 
for the evaluation of Hartz. Readers who are more interested in the precise 
empirical way of investigation applied in Labour Econonomics may refer to 
Angrist and Krueger (1999), Calmfors (1994) or Heckman, LaLonde and Smith 
(1999).  
The microeconomic dimension of evaluations takes into account the impacts 
of a certain policy on those who are directly involved. When we analyse the 
impact of e.g. training vouchers on unemployment duration we only consider 
the effect on the unemployed. We are investigating partial equilibria, which 
means that we ignore effects on the overall economy, like the adverse effects of 
higher taxes that are needed due to the introduction of the programme. Micro-
economic analyses are more common than those that deal with macro effects 
(Hujer and Caliendo 2000). 
The big problem with such (microeconomic) evaluations is that they are in-
herently counterfactual. In the ideal case we would be able to analyse an indi-
vidual’s behaviour for the case that he or she is affected by the programme 
under investigation, and at the same time in the counterfactual scenario in 
which the person would be unaffected. For instance we would be able to ob-
serve an unemployed person’s search behaviour, success in finding a job and 
the development of his or her earnings over time for the situation in which a 
certain policy – say the Hartz reform – has been introduced and for the counter-
factual situation in which there had been no legislative and administrative 
changes. Similar problems arise for the related counterfactual question in 
which we assume the policy change to have occurred, but we alter the question 
about individual participation in a measure. Let us take the example of a long-
term unemployed who due to the Hartz changes is eligible for obtaining a 
voucher that entitles him to placement services by a private company. Provided 
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that he or she obtains such a voucher and a private company tries to find an 
appropriate vacancy for this person, it is impossible to say what would have 
happened if he had not received such a voucher. This could be the case because 
the caseworker in charge did not consider this step necessary or was more 
inclined to take other measures. 
These are examples of situations in which we are interested in potential out-
comes that are important when trying to investigate the results of the welfare 
state. Even though they are difficult to find and intrinsically hypothetical they 
are the cornerstones of meaningful welfare state evaluations. This problem is 
referred to as the potential outcome approach, which is sometimes also called 
Roy-Rubin model (Hujer and Caliendo 2000).  
The precise technical details of the model are beyond our scope here, but I 
will explain the general idea behind it. In this model there are individuals, 
choices (either being treated or not) and results. The choice of the appropriate 
outcome depends on the purpose of the evaluation. It may be the duration of 
further unemployment, the income in the year following the intervention, or 
any other result. An evaluation may even be positive for a certain programme 
when considering one outcome, but would be negative when looking at another 
one. Decreasing unemployment benefits may have a positive impact on the 
chances of finding a job, but a negative impact on earnings.  
For every individual there is the outcome for the case that he or she is under 
treatment (YT) and the outcome for the case of not being treated, thus being in 
the control group (YC). 
The treatment effect of a specific programme is therefore the difference be-
tween YT and YC. As mentioned before, the difficulty is that we cannot find out 
the counterfactual outcome for each individual. A solution to this problem is to 
concentrate on mean outcome differences between groups. In order to illustrate 
this point let us consider two groups of people. The members of the first group 
each receive a training voucher (treatment group) whereas the members of the 
second do not (control group). If then the average duration of time until the 
members of the treatment group find jobs after the training is 8 weeks in com-
parison to 13 weeks for members of the control group, we can attribute this 
difference to the participation in the training scheme. Then of course we have 
to assume that the members of the two groups do not differ in any way apart 
from the fact that some have participated in the education programme and 
others not (ceteris paribus). In reality this assumption does not always hold. It 
may be that the caseworker in charge of the decision whether to assign a train-
ing voucher only lets jobseekers with certain characteristics participate in the 
programme. If he or she thinks that especially the long term unemployed with 
low qualifications deserve it, and thus assigns the voucher only to them, this 
group is put at an advantage. Conversely if the caseworker believes that such 
people are lost causes anyway, he or she may privilege people with relatively 
promising CVs.  
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The consequence is that the evaluation results of the training programmes’ 
effectiveness are strongly biased. For the first case it is likely that the impact is 
understated whereas in the latter case it is overstated. 
This discretion, which leads to an unequal treatment and violation of the 
above assumption, can – theoretically – still be accounted for, e.g. by inter-
viewing caseworkers about their criteria. These differences between individuals 
are observable, at least to the caseworker in charge. However many other char-
acteristics are unobservable. How can we accurately measure effort, a factor 
that is definitely crucial to successful placement but unevenly distributed 
among jobseekers in treatment and in the control group? 
The best solution to the above mentioned problems of unobserved differ-
ences would be a random assignment to the treatment and the control group. 
This is then a natural experiment in which it does not matter that there are also 
unobservable or unobserved differences between the groups. Due to the group 
assignment by chance these discrepancies will even out if there are a suffi-
ciently large number of people involved in the experiment. In the ideal case 
with let us say 100,000 jobseekers which are assigned to treatment and control 
group by chance, it is safe to assume that unobserved differences will move 
into both groups to the same extent. As an example, there will be highly moti-
vated individuals as well as lethargic people in both groups, and therefore the 
extent of potential bias due to unobserved characteristics is reduced in such 
experimental settings. 
Many characteristics which are theoretically observable are in reality unob-
served because the researcher does not take them into account – there are in-
definitely many characteristics and the more we incorporate into an analysis the 
more difficult it becomes. Alternatively the evaluator does not account for them 
because they are unobservable, or at least difficult to observe. Economic ex-
periments are so to say the ‘gold standard’ of evaluation due to their strengths 
in dealing with unobserved characteristics. The large number of people in the 
treatment group as well as in the control group makes it possible to attribute 
differences in the outcome variable (e.g. the duration of unemployment) to the 
treatment under investigation. The researcher can be relatively sure that that 
due to random assignment the effect of the policy measure becomes clear. We 
may say that the average differences in outcomes between the treatment and 
control group are an approximation of the unobservable treatment on the indi-
vidual. This allows estimating the counterfactual scenario of what would have 
happened if an individual had participated in a measure (if he/she had not in 
reality) or vice versa. Even if the outcome of the experiment can only take 
average effects into consideration, this may be precise enough for a researcher 
who wants to investigate the aggregate effects of a policy while ignoring the 
question what would have happened to each individual. It is safe to say that 
such experimental investigation settings mirror the methodology of the natural 
sciences. Social experiments are especially popular in the United States, 
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whereas in Europe and especially Germany they are less common. Objections 
towards such social experiments may be on ethical grounds (Hujer and 
Caliendo 2000): Why does my neighbour obtain more unemployment benefit 
than I do? The fact of merely being in the control group with more or less sup-
port may not sound convincing to those who are affected. It is not clear if it is 
only due to ethical considerations that experiments are less pronounced in 
Europe than in the US, but due to the strong position of American researchers 
in the economic community social experiments will perhaps, with the passage 
of time, become increasingly popular and widespread in Europe (Heckman et 
al. 1999). 
If natural experiments with random assignment are not possible, evaluators 
have to find alternative ways to answer their questions. A possibility that is 
often applied is matching. This means that the evaluator tries to find an unaf-
fected ‘twin’ for each person who benefits from the programme under investi-
gation. In order to give an example, let us refer to our job placement voucher 
described earlier. Assignment did not occur randomly but due to the case-
worker’s discretion. Now the researcher tries to find people who share exactly 
the same characteristics (e.g. age, level and kind of education, family status) 
apart from the fact that one ‘twin’ is in the group that was eligible for the 
voucher and the other ‘twin’ not. As both individuals share all observed charac-
teristics apart from programme participation the difference in the outcome 
variable – say the time period until successful placement – can be attributed to 
the programme. Fertig and Kluve (2004) describe matching as a strategy to 
approximate the context of a natural experiment after the programme took 
place. However, also this strategy is not unproblematic. Consider the case of a 
smaller programme with an insufficiently large amount of participants. How is 
it possible to find a person that is almost identical? Similar problems arise in 
the case that we have detailed information about participants’ and non-
participants’ biographies, which is also positive because thorough evaluations 
will try to find out lots of potential explanatory variables; but the more we 
know the harder it will be to find a ‘twin’ who shares all the characteristics 
(Fitzenberger and Hujer 2001). There are more sophisticated ways or matching 
that try to avoid the problems described above. The works by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) and Heckmann et al. (1999) have contributed to an advancement 
of a body of knowledge concerning the solution of problems related with 
matching (Fitzenberger and Hujer 2001). Such matching approaches can, like 
in the case of experiments, only try to find out average effects of a policy on 
the group of participants and non-participants and not say with precision what 
would have happened on the individual level in the counterfactual scenario. For 
most of the cases this should not be a problem, because the overall effect has a 
much bigger impact on the economy as a whole. This means that, although this 
question is relevant to the specific person, it is impossible to know what would 
have happened to single individual in the counterfactual case. 
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The third method we will highlight in this paper is the difference-in-
differences (did) methodology. It is an extended version of a simple before-
after analysis. The development of the outcome variable for a group of persons 
is compared to the fate of a second group that is expected to be unaffected by 
the policy change but still shares characteristics of the people from the group 
that is affected. The example described below can illustrate this point. It is an 
abridged and adapted form of did-estimation by Eissa and Liebman (1996) who 
investigated the impact of a tax reform act of 1986 in the USA (TRA-86) on 
labour force participation of single mothers. As we can see in Table 1, labour 
force participation of unmarried mothers with less than high school education 
(treatment group) increases by 1.8 percentage points (column 3, which is col-
umn 2 minus column 1) whereas for the first control group (same category of 
women who have no children) it fell by 2.3 percentage points. The policy 
change had the purpose to increase the number of lowly qualified single moth-
ers who are working. Therefore the researches set their development in relation 
to the control group who is not especially targeted by the reform. The fall in 
labour force participation of lowly qualified childless women even increases 
the impact of the policy change: The did-estimator amounts to 4.1 percentage 
points. If we set the development of the target group in relation to more quali-
fied unmarried women with children (control group 2) the impact of the reform 
is still positive, but the impact is smaller because also the second control 
group’s labour market situation improved. The did-estimator for the compari-
son with the second control group only amounts to 1.8 percentage points (1.8 
minus 0.9).  
Having taken into account the microeconomic effects that researchers con-
sider when carrying out evaluations this paper will shortly highlight some 
points that should be incorporated in macroeconomic evaluations. These relate 
not only to the relatively small group of people that the welfare programme 
under investigation seeks to target. They refer to the economy as a whole and 
must also investigate a large number of indirect effects. Fertig and Kluve 
(2004) as well as Fitzenberger and Hujer (2001) refer primarily to the leading 
contribution from Calmfors (1994) who makes a distinction between displace-
ments effects, substitution effects, deadweight loss and tax effects. Displace-
ment effects refer to the fact that some participants of a programme take up 
jobs that non-participants would otherwise have obtained. Substitution effects 
have to do with changes in relative wages induced by a programme which in 
turn reduces the demand for other types of non-participants. Deadweight losses 
have to do with results that would also have been achieved if there had been no 
specific programme. If, for example an employer would have hired a person 
even in the absence of a wage subsidy system, the subsidy turns out to be a 
redistribution of wealth from the state – or taxpayer – to the company that 
employs the person. Tax effects take into account that labour market policy has 
to be financed by taxation with adverse effects on the economy. A policy that 
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on the one hand increases the number of jobs by certain incentives to employ-
ers or workers, but on the other hand increases taxes and significantly reduces 
work incentives for all non beneficiaries is likely to be a failure on the macro 
level. Another crucial question in a thorough macroeconomic evaluation is the 
impact of reduced costs and higher tax revenues that are caused by a reduction 
in unemployment. As mentioned before, evaluations that take into account 
effects on the economy as a whole are more complex than microeconomic 
analyses which are, as we have seen above, already difficult to pursue. 
As we have seen, the methods highlighted in this chapter try to find out the 
average effect of certain welfare state instruments on people who are affected 
and on people who are unaffected. These approximations are important to 
researchers and policymakers who want to find out whether a certain pro-
gramme has been effective and efficient, because they are to the largest extent 
concerned with the overall effects and not so much about the counterfactual 
impact on an individual. If the target is to increase employment among single 
mothers, their overall employment ratio is of importance and not what happens 
to a specific mother. This may sound rude, but attempts to make causal claims 
on the individual level would be flawed and untrustworthy. 
Table 1: TRA-86 Labour Force participation (in %) 
Group Before (1) After 
(2) 
Difference (3) 
(2)-(1) 
Difference-
in differ-
ences (4) 
Treatment: 
Unmarried 
women, <12 
years of school-
ing, with chil-
dren 
47.9 49.7 1.8  
Control 1: 
Unmarried 
women <12 
years of school-
ing, without 
children 
78.4 76.1 -2.3 4.1 
Control 2: 
Unmarried 
women, >12 
years of school-
ing, with chil-
dren 
91.1 92.0 0.9 0.9 
Source: Eissa and Liebman (1996); Simplified and abridged version 
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Evaluation Results of the Hartz Reforms 
A thorough presentation of the impacts caused by the set of comprehensive 
labour market and welfare state reorientation would be beyond the scope of this 
paper. Nevertheless we will have a brief look at some findings related to the 
Hartz reforms. However we should keep in mind that there may be long-term 
consequences that cannot be foreseen now. Furthermore every evaluation must 
be clear about the counterfactual scenario to which the real world is compared. 
In the case of the Hartz reforms a natural candidate would be the situation in 
which legislation did remain the same as before the reforms. This allows inves-
tigating the specific changes brought by Hartz and thus attributes them to the 
new rules. But of course there may also be other counterfactuals that could, at 
least under different circumstances, make perfect sense. 
Jacobi and Kluve (2006) summarise a large amount of evaluations that have 
been carried out. For the introduction of placement vouchers that jobseekers 
can use for being placed by a private firm, an example mentioned before in this 
paper, the results seem to be poor. Many jobseekers did simply not use these 
vouchers. Additionally those who did and found a job were employed for a 
shorter time horizon than jobseekers who did not use placement vouchers 
(ibid.). Results for training programmes are not unambiguous, but it seems that 
due to shorter duration of programmes, assignment to training after shorter 
durations of joblessness and more competition among training providers, post-
Hartz training has become a bit more cost-efficient, although the net results are 
still negative. Additionally locking-in effects seem to be less dramatic than 
before. 
Jacobi and Kluve (2006) consider wage subsidies to employers as well as 
start-up subsidies as positive elements of the reform because the first increase 
the chances of employment and the latter have reduced the risk of unemploy-
ment. Minijobs have contributed to the creation of a large amount of jobs 
whereas Midijobs have only modestly been taken up. In the case of Midijobs 
displacement effects cannot be rules out.  
Temporary work deregulation has also increased the number of employees 
in such jobs. However, we should take into account that temporary workers are 
at the same time those who lose their jobs first in times of recession, a phe-
nomenon that has become apparent since the autumn of 2008. The decision to 
make fixed-term contacts renewable more easily for older employees does not 
seem to have had a significant impact (ibid.).  
Concluding Remarks 
We have seen that trying to evaluate the performance of welfare states is an 
important but difficult task. Therefore efforts to analyse social policy are be-
coming increasingly numerous. This is especially the case for Germany where 
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thorough scientific investigation about the effectiveness and efficiency of la-
bour market policy has become imperative since the introduction of SGB III 
and the Hartz laws. The latter laws had the purpose to improve placement and 
training services and to activate the unemployed, which means that they are 
under a stronger financial pressure to take up jobs. Furthermore some deregula-
tion of the labour market occurred. Conducting economic experiments would in 
many cased be the ideal method of evaluation, but there are ways to approxi-
mate the conditions of social experiments.  
Nevertheless we may not be able to find out the effects of a certain policy on 
a single individual because the counterfactual situation is not observable. In-
stead we consider average effects on a larger group of comparable people in 
order to make strong predictions. This may give us the feeling of what might 
have happened on the individual level, but this question remains highly specu-
lative and is beyond the scope of serious analyses. 
For thorough evaluation efforts it is important to keep in mind effects on the 
micro as well as on the macro level, which is more difficult. Keeping in mind 
all the difficulties and problems of such analyses we should interpret all results 
with care. This of course also holds for the impact analyses about the Hartz 
reforms. Even if an evaluation seems to have a positive effect on the outcome 
variable under investigation, deciding to focus on another outcome criterion 
may lead to different results. Even if a policy increases employment this does 
not rule out negative effects on earnings or outcome variables that are not taken 
into account by economists. It remains to be seen what future evaluations will 
find out, which methods will emerge and which outcome variables they will 
take into account. 
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